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Abstract
One of the most persistent criticisms of John Dewey is his failure to provide defi nite 
ends for education. Th is essay reconstructs Dewey’s educational thought to provide 
more guidance on the nature of educational ends. Rather than impose external ends 
and a rigid curriculum, Dewey provides evaluative criteria so that citizens them-
selves can assess the educational and democratic value of any practice, curricula, 
or institution. Th e political implications of this position are profound. It pushes 
away from expert-driven models of educational authority and towards empirically 
grounded deliberative processes to guide educational practice and policy.
Introduction
Dewey famously argues that the end of education is growth. Th is basic idea, widely 
criticized and oft en misunderstood, rests on a series of more complex arguments 
about the nature of education, human experience, and social life. First, Dewey un-
derstands education as the reconstruction of experience. As such, there is an inti-
mate and inextricable relation between a person’s life experiences on one side and 
educational methods, content, and ends on the other. We learn by gaining a better 
sense of the meaning of present experiences and by increasing our ability to direct 
future experiences (MW 9: 83). Second, we grow when learning opens up oppor-
tunities for future growth and thereby enables us to continue our education (MW 
9: 107). In this sense, there are no ends outside of the processes of education; it is 
its own end (MW 9: 54). Th ird, as a result, Dewey consistently rejects any move to 
impose ultimate or external ends for education. To do so would violate Dewey’s 
experiential conception of education.1 
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Th e idea that the end of education is growth provokes scorn from radically dif-
ferent perspectives. At one extreme are writers like E. D. Hirsch (1996, 1987), Allan 
Bloom (1987), and Diane Ravitch (2001, 2000), who argue that Dewey’s lack of ends 
eviscerates the content of “core knowledge” and fragments any sense of coherence 
in curriculum. Th e result of progressive reforms, according to Hirsch (1996), has 
been widespread cultural illiteracy; this illiteracy is a particular problem for civic 
life in that students lack the core common knowledge to have an “eff ective national 
conversation” (xi). At the other end of the spectrum are critical educational theo-
rists like Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (1976), who argue that contemporary 
educational systems produce docile subjects. Th ey call for education that encour-
ages critical independent thinking in order to challenge existing social structures 
and norms (see also Freire, 1970; Feinberg and Rosemont, 1975). Bowles and Gintis 
(1976) criticize Dewey and progressive education for not interrogating the role that 
schools play in reproducing dominant relations of capitalist production. Th e short-
coming of Dewey’s approach is that “the problem, clearly, is to fi x up the people, 
not change the economic structures which regulate their lives” (p. 26). In this vein, 
they see little critical traction in Dewey’s educational thought. For these critics, pro-
gressive education does not lead students to question the status quo nor encourage 
schools to question their roles in perpetuating the current social order. At the most 
basic level, each position is uncomfortable with Dewey’s claim that “growth itself 
is the only moral ‘end’” (MW 12: 181). Taken together, critics argue that Dewey’s 
educational vision is confused and confusing. Growth, they argue, provides little 
guidance on how to construct educational goals or structure a curriculum. 
Although Dewey directly addressed this question and many other people 
have come to his defense, this line of criticism has had a curious staying power (see 
Dewey, LW 13: 7-11, 48-63; Hook, 1949, 1957, 1985a; see also Kliebard, 1995; Suppes, 
1996). In a very important sense, this line of criticism is valid. Dewey steadfastly 
refused to provide an ultimate end for education. He maintained that there are no 
ends that transcend the specifi c practices and contexts of education. Despite this 
argument, I believe we can reconstruct Dewey’s educational thought to provide 
clearer guideposts on the ends of education. Rather than impose specifi c curricu-
lar aims, Dewey provides evaluative criteria so that citizens themselves can assess 
the educational and democratic value of any practice, curricula or institution. Th is 
stance is at the heart of Dewey’s radicalism and antifoundationalism; it is also the 
source of considerable critique. Many commentators are not comfortable with his 
radical belief that “ordinary” educational actors (students, parents, teachers, ad-
ministrators) have the capacity to determine their own ends. Th e political impli-
cations of this position are profound. It pushes away from expert driven models 
of educational authority towards empirically grounded deliberative processes that 
might guide educational practice and policy. 
I believe this is an important time to return to Dewey precisely because recent 
policy shift s have directed our attention away from these deliberative processes. In 
E&C ?  Education and Culture
30  ?  R. W. Hildreth
a variety of ways, education policy has become motivated by increasingly specifi c—
and technocratic—aims of academic achievement. Th ese shift s have been widely 
documented. Th e No Child Left  Behind Act (NCLB), in a variety of ways, urged 
states and localities to defi ne specifi c ends—and measurable targets—for student 
achievement. Critics such as Rothstein and Jacobsen (2006) argue that this defi ni-
tion of student achievement is overly narrow. Other critics have argued that it has 
created misguided and counterproductive testing policies (Menken, 2006; McNeil, 
2005). In fact, the end of improving test scores has created perverse incentives for 
educational policy; fi ft een states have lowered standards in order to achieve goals for 
profi ciency (Bandeira de Mello, Blankenship, & McLaughlin, 2009, p. vi-viii). While 
researchers have long documented the deleterious eff ects of these reforms, Diane 
Ravitch, as an early advocate and now critic of NCLB, has focused new attention 
on the narrowing purposes of education. In her recent critical assessment of these 
reforms, she writes, “testing, I realized with dismay, had become a central preoccu-
pation in the schools and was not just a measure but an end in itself” (2010a, p. 12). 
Moreover, increasingly narrow and standardized measures of academic 
achievement have been paired with increasingly privatized and expert-driven school 
governance. Charter schools, while publicly fi nanced, famously trade increased au-
tonomy for increased accountability. In exchange for meeting defi nitive academic 
targets, independent groups can create schools removed from district bureaucracy 
and oversight. Increasingly specifi c curricular missions appeal to particular stu-
dents and families, positioning citizens as consumers who can choose—or exit—
schools on the basis of pre-existing preferences (Wilson, 2010). Small school reform 
eff orts (Ancess & Allen, 2006; Ready & Lee, 2008) and “portfolio” models of school 
management (Bulkley & Henig, 2010) have translated many of these assumptions 
to district levels. And, as Ravitch (2010b) argues, these reform models are increas-
ingly distanced from democratic governance and deliberation. In this sense, recent 
policy supports a variety of means to reach ends that are increasingly not open for 
debate, revision, or deliberation. In contrast, educational ends—viewed in terms 
of academic achievement—are understood to be self-evident and non-negotiable. 
Th ese policy shift s have created an atmosphere of increased achievement by any 
means necessary, including market-based competition between schools and rote 
methods that “teach to the test.”
In this essay, I argue that Dewey’s understanding of ends provides critical 
resources to help us both understand and respond to the increasingly narrow and 
technical focus of education practice and policy. To make good on this argument, 
it is necessary to reconstruct his understanding of the ends of education, and to 
respond to the widely held belief that growth off ers little practical guidance for edu-
cators and policymakers. My reconstruction proceeds in four steps: in the second 
section, I review Richard Hofstadter’s critique of Dewey. I discuss Dewey’s general 
treatment of educational ends in Democracy and Education in the third section. I 
then turn, in the fourth section, to a discussion of how these general ends can be ap-
plied to specifi c goals dealing with work and citizenship. In the fi ft h and concluding 
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section, I return to Hostadter’s critique as well as discuss the political implications 
of emphasizing evaluative criteria rather than ends. I argue that Dewey provides 
a revitalized sense of the importance of democratic deliberation about the proper 
ends of education at all levels of practice.
Hofstadter’s Critique
Th e claims of Bloom, Hirsch, and Ravitch were preceded decades earlier by Richard 
Hofstadter’s (1963) compelling critique in Anti-Intellectualism in American Life. I 
focus on Hofstadter for several reasons: fi rst, he is a canonic source for later crit-
ics of Dewey; second, and more importantly, I believe he presents one of the more 
careful and nuanced criticisms of Dewey. He recognizes Dewey’s contributions, but 
sharply criticizes the implications and consequences of his educational thought. 
Even though Hofstadter’s real target is progressive education, he criticizes Dewey 
for the role that his thinking played in that movement. In eff ect, Dewey’s arguments 
were too easily misunderstood, and too easily applied to justify a wide variety of 
anti-intellectual educational reforms. 
While critical, Hofstadter also notes how “progressive education” made im-
portant contributions to educational methods—ending the domination of rote in-
struction, for instance. Th e problem with progressive education is that it remained 
confused about, and unable to defi ne, appropriate ends for education (Hofstadter, 
1963, p. 375). It is important to note that his argument is directed against both 
Dewey and the “perversion of his ideas” by advocates of progressive education. For 
Hofstadter, progressive education dissolved the content of curriculum, thereby 
contributing to the pervasive trend of anti-intellectualism in America. Part of ad-
dressing this critique, then, involves answering the question: is it fair to hold Dewey 
accountable for the perversion of his ideas? Hofstadter does not blame Dewey for 
anti-intellectualism; he correctly recognizes that one of Dewey’s central aims was 
to increase the level of intelligence in public life. However, he does criticize Dewey’s 
inability to consider the implications or limits of his ideas. 
For Hofstadter, this inattention to implications or limits is compounded by 
Dewey’s inability to present his ideas clearly. Th is defect contributes to wide mis-
understanding and misappropriation. Th e fi rst problem is Dewey’s writing. Hof-
stadter states, “Dewey wrote a prose of terrible vagueness and plasticity . . . His style 
is suggestive of the cannonading of distant armies: one concludes that something 
portentous is going on at a remote and inaccessible distance, but one cannot deter-
mine just what it is” (p. 361). But more than just a matter of bad writing, Hofstadter 
continues, “serious faults in style are rarely, if ever, matters of ‘mere’ style; they 
embody real diff erences in conception” (p. 361). Dewey’s tendency to be misinter-
preted, for Hofstadter, while exacerbated by his writing style, is actually the result 
of signifi cant gaps in his thought and problems in his logic. And this is a serious 
charge and deserves our attention. If Dewey indeed failed to make his ideas clear, 
he opens himself up to misappropriation. 
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 Hofstadter claims that the main defect in Dewey’s educational thought is 
making growth the very essence and only end of education (p. 373; see also Kandel, 
1943). Dewey’s idea of growth then becomes the source of endless diffi  culties for 
educational theory and practice. Growth, according to Hofstadter, is an inappro-
priate metaphor for education. Growth is a natural, genetic, and most importantly, 
automatic process; people do not have control over the way that they grow. In other 
words, growth is something that happens to us; we do not decide where and how we 
want to grow. In this, Hofstadter claims that Dewey ignores his own imperative that 
education is a social and reconstructed process. In positing growth, Dewey, in ef-
fect, abdicates any responsibility to determine the ends for education and social life. 
For Hofstadter, not only does Dewey provide a bad metaphor for education, 
but he also takes a worse step in confl ating education with growth. Th at is, Dewey 
does not simply compare education with growth; for him, education is growth, 
growth is life, and life is development. Hofstadter (1963) quotes the following pas-
sage from Democracy and Education: 
We have been occupied with the conditions and implications of growth . . . 
When it is said that education is development, everything depends on how 
development is conceived. Our net conclusion is that life is development, 
and that developing, growing, is life. Translated into its educational equiva-
lents, this means (i) that the educational process has no end beyond itself; 
it is its own end; and that (ii) the educational process is one of continual 
reorganizing, reconstructing, transforming. (p. 372; quoting  MW 9: 54)
For Hofstadter, if growth was simply a metaphor for education, society could still 
retain control over the ends, direction, and outcomes of that method or approach. 
But by equating education and growth, the growth of the child becomes more im-
portant than the traditions of society. Th e historical eff ect (and subsequent perver-
sion) of this idea is to set up the child’s interests (as growth) over and above society. 
Hofstadter acknowledges that Dewey never, in fact, argued for this. However, “the 
idea of growth invited educational thinkers to set up an invidious contrast between 
self-determining, self-directed growth from within, which was good, and molding 
from without, which was bad” (p. 373). Th e historical eff ect of this line of thinking, 
according to Hofstadter, “was to exalt the child and dismiss the problem of society, 
on the ground that the growth of the child stood for health, whereas the traditions 
of society (including curricular traditions) stood for outworn, excessively authori-
tative demands” (p. 374). 
Hofstadter argues that establishing growth as the only end of education makes 
it impossible to construct a coherent curriculum. Dewey’s insistence on concrete 
situations as the proper starting points for study means that “the kind of long-range 
evaluation of subjects which is necessary to the design of curricula becomes inor-
dinately diffi  cult” (p. 376). For Hofstadter, this diffi  culty—while not desirable in 
elementary school—becomes disastrous in the upper grades. Distinct studies need 
to be mastered, and mastery comes at the expense of connections to individual in-
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terest and possibly other subjects. For example, Hofstadter might argue that it is 
not possible to teach high school chemistry based on students’ experiences. Rather, 
it requires focused attention to a distinct subject and development of cumulative 
lessons of increasing complexity over time.
Th is idea of growth is also at odds with Dewey’s earlier writings in which 
he argues that education should be the “fundamental method of social progress” 
(EW 5: 93).2 In this idea of progressive growth and change, the individual and so-
cial dimensions of education are synthesized: schools become agents of change by 
educating individuals to be critical inquirers and social actors. Hofstadter argues 
that Dewey cannot have it both ways. Dewey either has to “sacrifi ce the ideal of 
education as growth or abandon the goal of ‘forming minds’ in accordance with 
adult, and hence externally imposed, vision of the good society” (1963, p. 379; see 
also Cunningham, 1994).3
In sum, Hofstadter raises important concerns about Dewey’s educational 
thought. In particular, he questions whether Dewey provides defi nite ends, useful 
criteria, and substantive curricula. While I will directly address his critique later 
in the essay, a few points are worth foreshadowing. While Dewey indeed does not 
prescribe a set curriculum; he does, however, model the process of curricular deci-
sion making by off ering a sustained discussion of the role and sequence of various 
subjects: history, science, geography, mathematics, and so on. In response to the 
criticism that Dewey cannot have it both ways, we need to remember that ends are 
not imposed by adults in pursuit of social progress, but are the products of demo-
cratic deliberations at all levels of educational life (home, classroom, school, district, 
state, nation, etc.). He attempts to provide guidance for these deliberations with his 
vision of democratic education. In this sense, the more diffi  cult question is whether 
Dewey provides suffi  cient guidance for educators and citizens to determine their 
own ends. For instance, we still need to ask: Does Dewey’s approach ask too much 
of students, parents, teachers, administrators, or the general public? If so, how much 
of Hofstadter’s critique might still be salient?
General Aims of Education
For Dewey, the ends and the means of education are the same thing: the end of 
education is that individuals continue learning and growing throughout life (MW 
9: 107). Hofstadter suggests that this confl ation of ends and means is confusing 
and misleading. In this section I address this criticism by focusing our attention 
on a key phrase in Dewey: “Th e very idea of education is a freeing of individual 
capacity in progressive growth directed at social aims” (MW 9: 105). What exactly 
does Dewey mean by “progressive growth”? What are the “social aims” by which 
growth is directed? How are social aims determined? Th roughout this section, I 
argue that Dewey’s view of progressive growth provides a compelling alternative 
to the fi xed ends advocated by many of his critics, and taken up in new forms by 
current educational policy. 
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Before proceeding, it is worthwhile to consider what Dewey means by an 
“end.” Although deeply infl uenced by Hegel, Dewey became a life-long critic of any 
notion of telos or an absolute end for human aff airs. In his educational thought, this 
required the ends of education be connected to students’ lived experiences, means 
(methods), content (subject matter), and concrete social conditions. Th e relationship 
between means and ends, for Dewey, should not be understood as a dualism, but 
as a fl exible continuum. In Democracy and Education, ends are defi ned in terms of 
intentional results: “[It] implies an orderly and ordered activity, one in which the 
order consists in the progressive completing of a process. Given an activity having 
a time span and cumulative growth within the time succession, an aim end means 
foresight in advance of the end or possible termination” ( MW 9: 108) Here, ends 
become a part of a process, one stage in a continuum. Dewey actually preferred to 
use the term “ends-in-view” to capture this sense of process. Th is term keeps our 
attention on the ends of the particular task at hand and reminds us that ends are 
always provisional and changing throughout the course of educational experiences. 
Th us, ends-in-view are deliberately open ended; they represent a series of distinc-
tions and criteria to measure and guide our practice. Later in the essay, I argue that 
Deweyan ends function as evaluative tools, allowing teachers, students and citizens 
to assess the ends for individual growth, vocational development, citizenship, and 
the general nature of education in a democratic society. 
Individual Ends 
Dewey off ers the general principle of growth as the primary criteria to assess the 
educational value of experiences. Simply put, growth represents learning experi-
ences that open up (rather than foreclose) opportunities for further growth. If a 
person gains a better sense of the meaning of experience and gains a greater sense 
of control over future experiences, they are better prepared to apply what they have 
learned fl exibly in future situations. In other words, growth represents a form of 
learning that enables individuals to continue learning throughout their lives. Th is 
basic understanding of growth forms the basis for some key distinctions. Dewey 
holds that some experiences are noneducational, some are educational, and some 
are mis-educational. Noneducational experiences are simply unrefl ective. In rou-
tine experiences we do what is expected or customary without considering either 
the aims or meaning of experience. 
Th e distinction between educational and mis-educational experience is cen-
tral to understanding the broader ends of education. Experiences are mis-educative 
in the sense that we learn, but do not grow. By way of illustration, Dewey distin-
guishes between training (the routine mastery of skills unconnected to purposes) 
and education. “Trade education,” at least in its worst forms, is a process of mis-
education because it teaches students mindlessly to master specifi c skills or trades 
(MW 8: 119-120). A favorite example of Dewey’s is a “gang of thieves” (MW 9: 88). 
We can imagine how the gang teaches a young recruit to become a thief. Th rough 
practice and study, our young thief becomes profi cient at stealing, laundering loot, 
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and maybe even leading her own gang. In the end, these “learning” experiences 
are mis-educative. While our thief is certainly becoming more skilled and knowl-
edgeable, this learning limits the depth and breadth of her future experiences. Most 
importantly, the thief cannot interact freely with others, which severely diminishes 
her future possibilities for growth. In eff ect, there is learning but not in the service 
of growth. Th e key thing to remember is that this criterion of growth can be applied 
to any experience, practice, or curricula. 
Dewey further qualifi es the principle of growth by adding criteria to specify 
how an individual develops or grows. He off ers two criteria—interaction and con-
tinuity—to assess educative experiences. Th e fi rst criterion holds that educational 
experiences involve the deliberate act of experimenting in the world ( MW 9: 142, 
 284; LW 13: 31). As opposed to unthinking or nonrefl ective behavior, we learn when 
we consciously think through possible alternative courses of action and are attentive 
to consequences. Th e second criterion holds that isolated activities are not educa-
tional. Learning experiences must both connect to one’s past life experience and 
open up future opportunities for growth. In this sense, connections between school 
and society—and between an individual’s current experiences and possible future 
pursuits—become more explicit. Experiences should develop habits and attitudes 
that open up other lines of growth, and help an individual evaluate the quality of 
future experiences (LW 13: 23).
So far we have been discussing growth at a general level. At this point, there 
is no content or specifi c direction to growth. We can imagine that Hofstadter would 
argue that this principle of growth, without any discussion of content, is radically 
underdetermined. To respond, it’s necessary to turn to the second clause of Dewey’s 
defi nition of education—“progressive growth directed at social aims” (MW 9: 105).
Social Ends
As Hofstadter noted, Dewey’s insistence that the ends and means of education are 
identical does not appear to provide any guidance in defi ning the larger purposes 
of education, or what Dewey would call “social aims” or “social ends” ( MW 9: 104, 
105). It is important to remember Dewey’s earlier educational writings that call for 
a balanced consideration of the individual and social ends of education. In 1897, 
Dewey argued that we should educate individuals to have “an interest in community 
welfare, an interest . . . in perceiving whatever makes for social order and progress, 
and for carrying these principles into execution” (EW 5: 63). Th is interest in com-
munity is framed as the “ultimate ethical habit” to which all other habits should 
be directed. While a rather noble idea, this statement runs right into Hofstadter’s 
concern about how much guidance is required to determine these social ends. Even 
sympathetic interpreters such as Nel Noddings (1998) advance a similar critique: 
“Even as we admire and accept most of Dewey’s advice on the conduct of education, 
we may worry about the criteria children will use to ‘shape and direct’ change. We 
know they must be social, but can the social be relied on to shape itself?” (p. 480). 
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Dewey acknowledges this worry. In Democracy and Education, he considers 
the inherent tensions in any national system of education, detailing the compet-
ing roles played by nationalism, democracy, and other social aims. Dewey reminds 
us that any conception of the social is contextual. As he states, the “conception of 
education as a social process and function has no defi nite meaning until we defi ne 
the kind of society we have in mind” (MW 9: 103). Dewey argues—agreeing with 
his critics, in a sense—that we need a clearer conception of the social as a function 
and test of education. He states: “Th is contradiction (for it is nothing less) between 
the wider sphere of associated and mutually helpful social life and the narrower 
sphere of exclusive and hence potentially hostile pursuits and purposes, exacts of 
educational theory a clearer conception of the meaning of ‘social’ as a function and 
test of education than has yet been attained” (MW 9: 104). Dewey’s call for a clearer 
conception of the social begs for an answer. Yet, Dewey simply moves on from this 
point. Surprisingly, he does not off er a defi nition or sustained discussion of the so-
cial in Democracy and Education. He does say that “a true social group” involves 
“a sharing of purposes, a communication of interests” (MW 9: 9), but does not give 
any guidance to what these purposes might be. Th is seems like a glaring omission 
in Dewey’s thought, particularly considering his claims that education is a social 
process, individuals are social beings, schools are social institutions, and the like. 
I argue that the absence of a substantive discussion of the social is both an 
important omission and a surprising strength in Dewey’s theory. In one sense, this 
omission reveals Dewey’s radical antifoundational bent as a thinker. In failing to 
spell out the social, Dewey moves away from commonly accepted sources of au-
thority such as tradition, philosophy, or God for determining the ends of education. 
In another sense, this omission reveals a diff erent kind of political project. Dewey 
is attempting to chart a complicated path: trying to identify comprehensive social 
ends without resorting to the dangers of nationalism. Th ese dangers remained in 
the background of Dewey’s thinking about the social, and framed the nature and 
content of his response. Although Dewey did not off er a substantive defi nition of 
the social, I argue that we can—by looking more widely in his thinking—construct 
two possible responses to the “problem of the social.” First, the very process of ex-
perimental inquiry gestures towards the defi nition of social ends. Second, Dewey 
off ers democracy as the ideal and criteria to guide the defi nition of the social. 
It is fi rst important to notice the negative argument Dewey makes: social aims 
should not be determined externally to the processes of education. Th is, by way of 
contrast, focuses our attention on its opposite: the internal processes of education. 
Th is shift —from externally imposed defi nition to internally developing processes—
means that social aims are defi ned in and through educational practices, coopera-
tive inquiry, and collective decision making. Moreover, we need to remember that 
Dewey’s educational methods should always be understood in terms of specifi c 
situations. In conceiving education as a way of living and school as an embryonic 
community, learning is framed as a cooperative eff ort of acting and learning with 
others. By locating experimental inquiry within this cooperative context, problems 
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are necessarily social problems. In eff ect, education is necessarily social and po-
litical; these dimensions are built into the very contours of experimental inquiry 
(Hildreth, 2009, p. 789). 
While experimental inquiry is constitutively social, how does this inquiry 
take us beyond the social world we fi nd ourselves in? What prevents inquiry from 
being parochial? As Dewey points out: “Since education is a social process, and 
there are many diff erent kinds of societies, a criterion for educational criticism and 
construction implies a particular social ideal” (MW 9: 105). And democracy, not 
surprisingly, is this ideal. For Dewey, the social ideal of democracy is more than a 
form of government, but “conjoint communicated experience” where all citizens 
have a “clear consciousness of a communal life” (MW 9: 93; LW 2:  328). In other 
words, democracy is a way of life in which all citizens have a better understanding 
of the nature of communal life and therefore can make more enlightened collec-
tive decisions. In Democracy and Education he off ers two criteria for educational 
criticism and construction: 
1. Th e more numerous and more varied points of shared common interest 
and greater reliance upon the recognition of mutual interests as a factor in 
social control. 
2. Th e freer interaction between social groups which brings about a change 
in social habits due the continuous readjustment of interacting with diff er-
ent groups. ( MW 9: 92)
At fi rst glance, these criteria do not appear to have much to do with education. Th e 
fi rst seems to be a normative goal that mutual interests should guide collective de-
cisions. Th e second gestures towards a sense of social life that is open, pluralistic, 
and interactive. 
Upon closer inspection, we can see a much deeper argument. If we take seri-
ously the injunction that education starts with experience and experience is social, 
the fi rst criterion calls for a greater role for all actors (students, parents, teachers, 
administrators) in determining the conditions of learning and growth. Moreover, 
the second criterion holds that conditions for growth are enhanced through en-
countering diff erence; hence, the importance of variation and interaction. But the 
real pay-off  for education comes when we combine the two criteria. Dewey states: 
“Th e extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an inter-
est so that each has to refer to his own action to that of others, and to consider the 
action of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to breaking 
down those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men from per-
ceiving the full import of their activity” (MW 9: 93). Th e aim of democracy and 
education is for people to develop mutual interests and gain a sense of the broader 
consequences of social interactions. Taken together, Dewey’s criteria point towards 
ideal social conditions for individual growth. Mutual interest eliminates the arti-
fi cial barriers between persons and diff erent forms of experiences. Th is opens up 
greater possibilities for interaction, learning, and growth. 
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Rather than defi ning social ends, Dewey gives us democratic criteria. Th is 
requires that educators, public offi  cials, and citizens themselves do the diffi  cult work 
of discussing, debating, and implementing visions of education in conversation with 
democratic ideals. Here, Hofstadter might say, “so far so good.” Educational actors 
should debate the ends of education. Th e problem is that growth—even when de-
fi ned as more numerous points of shared common interest and freer interaction 
between social groups—is still too vague of an idea to address the diffi  cult and 
technical questions of constructing a curriculum (see also Suppes, 1996). However, 
what Hofstadter seems to miss here is that Dewey’s criteria do not help us create 
educational ends ex nihilo. Instead, criteria are used to assess both current and pro-
posed educational goals, methods, and content. It is up to practitioners to do the 
hard work of applying the criteria to specifi c proposals and practices. To show how 
Dewey can be helpful in more specifi c terms, I turn to a discussion of commonly 
posed ends for education: work and citizenship.
Two Specifi c Ends: Work and Citizenship 
A central point in the previous section is that the criterion of growth can be ap-
plied to any educational practice or institution. Dewey generally resisted giving us 
much detail on how this criterion applies to specifi c forms of schooling; to do so 
would violate his commitment to democratic ideals. In this section, I discuss two 
domains where Dewey gives us slightly more guidance: work and citizenship. Th ese 
serve to illustrate how Dewey’s criteria can be applied to specifi c ends for schooling. 
Work 
Dewey’s position on the relationship between education and future employment is 
structured by a fundamental tension.4 On one hand, he is clear that one of the essen-
tial purposes of schooling is the preparation of young people for lives of meaningful 
work (MW 9: 126). Indeed, an essential end for education is to give all students the 
ability to be “masters of their own economic and social careers” ( MW 9: 104). Given 
the fact that we spend the majority of our adult lives as workers, the challenge is to 
structure education and working conditions in ways conducive to individual growth. 
On the other hand, Dewey argues against conceiving of education as preparation 
for future living (MW 9: 59; LW 13: 28).5 Specifi cally, he believes that narrow train-
ing for a specifi c job (“learning to earn”) is a cramped view of education (MW 10: 
145). Not only is “trade training” inimical to growth, but “there is a grave danger 
that in insisting upon this end, existing economic conditions and standards will be 
accepted as fi nal” ( MW 9: 126). So the question looms large—how do you prepare 
young people for their future working lives in ways that are both vital for students and 
conducive to future growth? I argue that Dewey addresses this tension in two ways. 
Th e fi rst way centers on the adjective “meaningful.” What makes work mean-
ingful is actually more complex than it may fi rst appear. Dewey argues that edu-
cation can and should help individuals understand the larger social signifi cance 
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of their paid work. Th us, mind-numbing physical labor can be meaningful if the 
worker understands the role of her activities in the production process and the role 
of the company in the larger economy. Th is may seem a like a tepid consolation. 
Understanding the larger social processes of being a line cook at McDonald’s would 
probably make the work even more depressing. Dewey believes, however, that un-
derstanding the larger social and economic processes changes one’s attitude towards 
paid work. It allows us to see connections between our work and its consequences 
and therefore better enables us to learn and grow. 
Here, we can see how Dewey advocates learning through—although not 
for—occupations. Dewey and his collaborators set up occupations as “articulating 
centers” of the Laboratory School. Occupations played three roles in the Laboratory 
School: they organized studies, helped students understand the larger meaning of 
future work, and exposed students to a variety of possible vocations. Dewey off ers 
a special defi nition of occupations as “modes of activity which reproduce, or run 
parallel to, some form of work carried on in social life” (MW 1: 92). Th ese activities 
were designed to be closely related to the everyday world of students; as such, they 
focused on the occupations children would have encountered around the home: 
sewing, cooking, and so on. Th e aim of learning through occupations didn’t involve 
mastering tools, acquiring skills or producing objects. Rather, through engaging 
in occupations, the child is given “intellectual responsibility for selecting the ma-
terials and instruments that are most fi t, and give(n) an opportunity to think out 
his own model and plan of work, led to perceive his own errors, and fi nd out how 
to correct them” (MW 1: 92). Th us, occupations are academically rigorous, requir-
ing students to “put maximum consciousness into whatever is done” (MW 1: 93).
More importantly, these occupations mirror larger social, historical, and in-
dustrial processes. In this sense, students learn about industrial processes through 
simplifi ed constructive activities. Rather than just practicing craft work, Dewey ar-
gues that “we must conceive of [occupations] in their social signifi cance, as types of 
processes by which society keeps itself going” (MW 1: 10). Students not only learn 
how to weave, but “learn the progress of mankind in history” through investigat-
ing the science of fi bers, the history of development in use and manufacture, and 
the cultural dimensions of clothing (MW 1,: 14, 15). Th us, occupations enlarge ex-
perience through an examination of—and a working through—its geographic, ar-
tistic, literary, scientifi c, economic, and historical elements. Th rough investigating 
how society developed its means of production, students gain an intellectual and 
practical understanding of how society came to be. Against Hofstadter’s calls for 
specialization, education through occupations reinforces the idea that “all studies 
arise from aspects of the one earth and the one life lived upon it. We do not have 
a series of stratifi ed earths. When the child lives in varied but concrete and active 
relationships with the common world, his studies are naturally unifi ed” (MW 1: 
54). Such an education gives students an expanded notion of the political, economic, 
and social signifi cance of their future work and the fl exibility of intelligence needed 
to adjust to rapidly changing conditions. 
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Th e second way Dewey addresses the tension between training and prepara-
tion for meaningful work is through a reconsideration of vocation. Here, Dewey 
draws on earlier religious traditions of vocation to mount an argument against what 
was then called vocational, industrial, or trade education.6 Dewey’s innovation is to 
return to the older sense of vocation as “a calling” and then reconstruct it as plu-
ral, advancing the idea that people have many diff erent callings. Schooling should 
help individuals discover and develop a variety of “intelligently eff ective” voca-
tions (MW 9: 317). Th is notion of vocation contrasted with models at the time that 
pushed students, oft en on the basis of IQ tests, towards training for one line of paid 
employment. Recognizing that human beings are always more than their paid oc-
cupations, Dewey states, “we must avoid limitation of conception of vocation to the 
occupations where immediately tangible commodities are produced” (MW 9: 317). 
Th e term “vocation” signals that a particular constellation of interests and 
habits are an integral part of who we are. To put it diff erently, we could not be our-
selves, if we are not following our calling. When we are living our vocation, we both 
lose and fi nd ourselves in that particular object or activity. “In fact,” Dewey con-
tinues, “self and interest are two names for the same fact; the kind and amount of 
interest actively taken in a thing reveals and measures the quality of selfh ood which 
exists ( MW 9: 362). Th is continuous development of “interesting” experiences, of 
“losing and fi nding oneself” in a particular activity, coalesces into a sense of voca-
tion. Vocation, therefore, refers to the “the active moving identity of the self with 
a certain object” (MW 9: 362). When we are living our vocation, we fi nd meaning 
in our (paid or unpaid) work. 
Here we can see how the criterion of individual growth can be applied to the 
specifi c end of work. Because we spend most of our lives working, continued growth 
is best achieved when an individual’s vocational calling and paid work align. How-
ever, the fact of rapid economic change means that particular jobs, industries, and 
skills may become obsolete. Th us, Dewey advocates the development of a wide ar-
ray of vocational interests (MW 9: 317). Th is diversity of vocations helps individuals 
develop fl exible habits of inquiry and action. An expanded sense of interests and 
expertise allows individuals to be better positioned to adjust, adapt, and thrive in a 
society marked by constant and rapid change. Even if they were aff ected by the inevi-
table changes in economic conditions, this enlarged sense of meaning and fl exibility 
means that they would not be at the mercy of a single industry or trade. Th is, in the 
end, is the best chance individuals can have greater control over their economic lives.
Citizenship 
Dewey’s pluralist conception of vocation overlaps with his normative understanding 
of citizenship. It is important to remember that Dewey consistently refused to treat 
education for citizenship as a distinct subject matter. I agree with Sandra Rosenthal 
(1993) and others that this is not an omission, but rather an indication that Dewey’s 
entire philosophy of education can be read in terms of citizenship. In addressing 
a meeting of teachers, Dewey said as much: “I take it for granted that we all admit 
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that, so far as our common school system of education is concerned, the main busi-
ness must be to prepare the boys and girls and young men and women who come 
to these schools to be good citizens, in the broadest sense” (MW 15: 158). So what 
exactly is good citizenship, in this “broadest sense”? Dewey is clear that we should 
not conceive citizenship in the narrow sense as the “capacity to vote intelligently, a 
disposition to obey laws, etc.” (EW 5: 58). In contrast to the “standard end” of civic 
education as training future citizens to be more informed voters, Dewey calls for a 
more encompassing education for citizenship that will “enable the child to recognize 
all his social relations and to carry them out” (EW 5: 58). For Dewey, a citizen is not 
merely a voter, but a family member, employee, friend, member of associations, and 
resident of a particular community (to name a few possible dimensions). He there-
fore advocates that young people “develop the power of observation, analysis, and 
inference with respect to what makes up a social situation and the agencies through 
which it is modifi ed” (EW 5: 73). Here we can see the overlap between Dewey’s plural 
conception of vocation and citizenship. If we read citizenship in vocational terms, 
it is a distinct mode of being in which an individual hears the political call of the 
world and possesses the critical and political habits to respond. 
Th inking in terms of Hofstadter’s critique, this conception of citizenship pro-
vokes a few questions: What exactly would this ideal of citizenship look like? And, 
is this defi nition of citizenship so broad that it lacks substantive content? I argue 
that, from the few places that Dewey explicitly discusses citizenship, we can glean 
possible ends for citizenship education. Two possibilities stand out.
First, Dewey argues that an important aim for citizenship education is to 
develop political judgment (MW 4: 290). Good judgment is based on a critical un-
derstanding of how political, social, and economic systems actually work. Dewey 
claims that schools have over-emphasized civic knowledge—learning about the 
institutions of government, how a bill becomes a law, and so on. Standard civics 
exclusively focuses on processes and institutions rather than looking how govern-
ment actually works. He goes onto say, “I don’t think we can pride ourselves upon 
really preparing our student body to make good citizens from a political point of 
view. We are preparing a somewhat passive body of citizens who will be managed 
and exploited either by political machines, or in reaction against them, by dema-
gogues and agitators” (MW 15: 163). Th is view directly challenges the “social ef-
fi ciency” movement in Dewey’s day and its emphasis on obedient citizenship. Th is 
critical vision of citizenship education calls for not only examining the power of 
government, but investigating the power behind government, especially the con-
nections between government and industry (MW 15: 160, 163). Interestingly, in this 
vein, Dewey advocates the study of economic history rather than political history 
( MW 9: 223-224). Th is is not just knowledge for the sake of knowledge. Rather it is 
knowledge that will lead to better judgment in evaluating political problems and 
plans (MW 15: 163).
Th e second aim focuses on developing capacities to eff ect social and politi-
cal change (MW 9: 93). Th is takes us back to the democratic criteria discussed in 
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the previous section. Dewey argues that a democratic society should be interactive, 
diverse, and fl exible. Th us, he urges individuals to join and share in the direction 
of groups in which they belong (including the workplace). Th ese groups represent 
“democracy as a way of life” on a small scale and provide the opportunity to “prac-
tice” the skills of democratic life—communication, deliberation, negotiation, and 
problem solving. Dewey hopes that participatory processes, in all forms of social 
life, will provide the conditions for individual growth in harmony with the com-
mon interests of the group.
While groups represent a learning opportunity, as it were, Dewey is acutely 
aware that groups can sometimes be undemocratic or even antidemocratic. Th is 
leads to Dewey’s second educational criterion of free and full interaction between 
groups (a standard that the band of thieves would not meet). Dewey believes that 
this interaction between groups has both an educative and democratic function. 
As noted above, broad interaction between groups helps to break down barriers 
and therefore opens up further opportunities for growth. By seeing how the conse-
quences of actions of one group aff ect other groups or the larger public, individuals 
can learn the broader public meanings of their actions. Th is, Dewey believes, is a key 
part of developing “good citizens.” He states that “a good citizen fi nds in his con-
duct of a political group enriching and enriched by his participation in family life, 
industry, scientifi c and artistic associations. Th ere is a free give-and-take: fullness 
of integrated personality is therefore possible of achievement, since the pulls and 
responses of diff erent groups reënforce one another and their values accord” (LW 
2: 328). Here we see the specifi c content to Dewey’s early articulation of citizenship 
in its broadest sense. It is not just citizenship across social roles, but it is a particular 
political orientation to the world that is embedded in and across roles. 
Both of these inquiries—into the specifi c ends of work and citizenship—of-
fer examples of how we might read within (and across) Dewey to reconstruct ends 
in expansive and democratic terms. Dewey deliberately leaves the social ends of 
education open, but, through his discussion of citizenship, shows how everyday 
citizens might develop the capacities to determine them collectively. Here, too, we 
can see how vocational and civic ends overlap: both stress diversity and fl exibility; 
both aim to provide individuals a sense of who they are in the world and a sense 
of how the world works. In this sense, they both give individuals greater control 
over their working lives as well as the collective conditions of existence. In a world 
defi ned by constant fl ux, Dewey constructs ends for work and citizenship that help 
individuals understand, adapt to, and possibly direct social change. 
Conclusions
Dewey’s ideal of education advances a particular vision for an “educated indi-
vidual” and a democratic society. Th is individual has developed fl exible habits of 
critical inquiry to continue learning throughout their lives. Th ey have a wide va-
riety of interests and vocations. Th is fl exibility and breadth allows individuals to 
have greater control over their economic lives and be more eff ective participants 
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in democratic life. In this conclusion, I respond to Hofstadter, and discuss in more 
depth the contribution Dewey’s educational thought might make to contemporary 
discussions of educational ends. 
Recall that Hofstadter sharply criticized Dewey for failing to provide defi nite 
ends for education. Defi ning just what these defi nite ends might mean takes us to 
the crux of the matter. As the previous section details, Dewey provides criteria and 
democratic processes for citizens (students, teachers, parents, administrators, etc.) 
to determine ends for education. Th e ends that Dewey proposes are open; they re-
main defi antly indefi nite. So, strictly speaking, Hofstadter is correct: Dewey does not 
supply defi nite ends. I argue that Dewey’s refusal to name defi nite ends represents 
his radicalism. Dewey leaves ends open because he trusts citizens to determine the 
social ends and implement educational programs accordingly. Here, Dewey poses 
the question of ends as ineluctably political. Th e ends of education must be deter-
mined at every level of teaching and learning, through collective deliberation and 
possibly political struggle. 
However, Hofstadter contends that Dewey’s undefi ned ends—in the hands 
of progressive educators—proved confusing and deleterious for American educa-
tion. For Hofstadter, growth is not only a poor metaphor for education, but also 
encourages educators to place the interests of the child over society, curriculum, 
and tradition. Th is secondary point raises a more important question, in my view, 
especially when reframed around what Dewey does off er: not ends, but criteria to 
guide our ends. In this vein, I believe that Hofstadter’s criticism might be valuably 
reframed in the following question: Does Dewey provide suffi  cient guidance so 
that citizens can determine their own ends and construct educational practices, 
systems, or institutions accordingly? 
I argue that Dewey’s criteria for assessing growth, democratic control, and 
social interaction are clear. On a basic level, these criteria can be applied to any 
educational practice or program, from formal schooling to informal learning. It is 
challenging, but not impossible, to apply the criterion of growth in a school setting. 
Indeed, most eff orts at assessment seek to “measure” learning. Measuring growth, 
however, requires both careful attention to individual students and attention to 
their learning over time. It also expands our view from only looking at particu-
lar activities or subjects—reading for instance—to how these activities or subjects 
aff ect broader domains of individuals’ lives. For Dewey, continued debate—and 
democratic control—over curriculum will always be better than posing any fi nal 
standards or rigid developmental logic. Th is stance, however, does not mean that 
there are no ends for curriculum. Th e criteria of growth, democratic control and 
interaction simply ask for more careful design, fl exibility, monitoring, adjustment, 
and judgment in developing and implementing curriculum at every level. 
Th is vision of democratic control, deliberation and evaluation is increasingly 
far removed from education reform and policy today. While it is outside the scope 
of this essay to present a full-scale Deweyan analysis of current policy, it is possible 
to gesture towards questions such an analysis would address (see Finnell-Gudwien, 
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2006). Considering increasingly narrow understandings of academic achievement, 
Dewey might urge us to ask a series of larger questions: how do these ends connect 
with concrete social conditions, in specifi c classrooms, schools and communities? 
How are these ends connected with the means of education; that is, with approaches 
of teaching and learning in actual classroom environments? Even if we can agree on 
academic ends-in-view, how might they be measured in ways that are not discon-
nected from the judgment and authority of teachers and local school communities? 
Likewise, how can we support school reform eff orts that support and strengthen 
the ability of everyday citizens to deliberate about—and actively determine—edu-
cational ends in their own contexts? 
In this spirit, increasingly technocratic reforms may provide an opportunity 
to question the ends of education, and how they are determined. Dewey does not—
as Hofstadter notes—provide “defi nite ends” for education. Th is is not an omission. 
Instead of posing defi nite ends for education, Dewey believes in the capacities of 
educational actors to determine their own ends. Th is belief is not blind. Dewey out-
lines how individuals might develop civic habits and capacities to engage in the co-
construction of social ends. Moreover, he stresses criteria—of growth, democratic 
control, and social interaction—that citizens might collectively use to evaluate and 
construct educational practices and goals that are both connected to local circum-
stances and directed towards broader social aims. Most importantly, for Dewey, 
neither philosophers, nor policy experts alone, can determine the ends of education. 
Th e question of ends—however complex and diffi  cult—remains a question for the 
diverse stakeholders at each level of education practice, from classrooms to state 
departments of education.7 Only through continued conversation about possible 
ends and careful attention to consequences can we approximate Dewey’s ideal of 
democratic education.
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Notes
1.  To be more precise, Dewey argues that philosophers cannot conceive of ends outside a 
concrete social setting and then impose them on a particular educational practice. Dewey rejects 
any ultimate end “to which education is subordinate” (MW 9: 107). He also rejects any ends 
outside of or external to the educational process (MW 9: 116). As he states, “Th e philosophy 
of education neither originates nor settles ends. It occupies an intermediate and instrumental 
or regulative place. Ends actually reached, consequences that actually accrue, are surveyed, 
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and their values estimated in the light of a general scheme of values” (LW 5: 29). Ends always 
emerge from—and must be tied back to—concrete situations, processes and practices.
2.  Dewey has been repeatedly critiqued for his naiveté on this point (see Cohen, 1998; 
Kaufmann-Osbourn, 1984). Th ese critics argue that Dewey relies too much on education as 
a vehicle for social progress and fails to take existing social structures into account. Th ere 
is some credence to these criticisms. First, Dewey does not articulate exactly how schools 
should or could bring about reform. We are left  with the assumption that if given a progres-
sive education, students would become reformers in their adult lives. Such adults would see 
the social signifi cance of their work, be able to continue learning through their work, and 
have fl exible habits to adjust to new situations. Th us, like many forms of participatory theory, 
the onus for change is placed on the shoulders of students, as future citizens. In this vein, 
Westbrook (1991) criticizes the Dewey School for “preparing students for life in a society 
that did not exist” (p. 111). It is important to note that Dewey recognized the diffi  culties 
involving school reform at an early stage in his career. In the same year Dewey wrote School 
and Society, he also wrote an essay titled “Th e Educational Situation.” Here Dewey gives a 
detailed analysis of the diffi  culty of reforming schools themselves (MW 1: 269). Th is analy-
sis reveals that Dewey was aware that the relationship between schools and social reform 
was more complicated. Additionally, by the mid-teens his optimism about schools as the 
sole agents of social progress had dampened. Perhaps chastened by his experiences with the 
Laboratory School, the later Dewey saw schools as one of many possible sources of change. 
3.  Craig Cunningham (1994) presents a sophisticated analysis of how the concept of 
aims evolved in Dewey’s educational thought. He agrees with Hofstadter on the view that 
Dewey’s early educational writings presupposed a “’pre-established harmony’ between the 
individual and society” (p. 6). While I agree that Dewey’s early work was still infected with 
Hegelian idealism, Cunningham misses the vital role that democracy plays in determining 
educational ends at all levels of practice. 
4.  In this section, I use the Deweyan terms work, occupation, and vocation. Because 
Dewey did not always use these terms in consistent ways, I defi ne them here in the follow-
ing way. Work “signifi es purposeful activity . . . that is subordinated to an external result . 
. . [and defi ned by a] a longer course of activity”(MW 9: 212). I use Dewey’s pedagogical 
defi nition of occupation in School and Society as “a mode of activity on the part of the child 
which reproduces, or runs parallel to, some form of work carried on in social life” (MW 1: 
92). For vocation, I draw primarily on Democracy and Education, where Dewey discusses 
vocation as a calling, “a direction of life activities as renders them perceptibly signifi cant to 
a person and also useful to his associates” (MW 9: 316). 
5.  Th e relationship between education and preparation is complex. In Democracy and 
Education, Dewey rejects traditional conceptions that understand education as preparation. 
Th e problem with preparation is that it imposes external ends on educational processes. In 
“My Pedagogic Creed,” Dewey off ers a qualifi cation on preparation: “it is impossible to fore-
tell defi nitely just what civilization will be twenty years from now. Hence it is impossible to 
prepare the child for any precise set of conditions. To prepare him for the future life means 
to give him command of himself; it means so to train him that he will have the full and ready 
use of all his capacities; that his eye and ear and hand may be tools ready to command, that 
his judgment may be capable of grasping the conditions under which it has to work, and the 
executive forces be trained to act economically and effi  ciently. It is impossible to reach this 
sort of adjustment save as constant regard is had to the individual’s own powers, tastes, and 
interests—say, that is, as education is continually converted into psychological terms” (EW 
5: 66).
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6.  Kliebard (1995) argues that that one of Dewey’s strengths and weakness in these 
debates was exactly this appropriation and reconstruction of existing concepts and theories.
7.  David Labaree (1997) makes a similar point: “I argue that the central problems 
with American education are not pedagogical or organizational or social or cultural in na-
ture but are fundamentally political. Th at is, the problem is not that we do not know how 
to make schools better but that we are fi ghting among ourselves about what goals schools 
should pursue. Goal setting is a political, and not a technical, problem. It is resolved through 
a process of making choices and not through a process of scientifi c investigation. Th e answer 
lies in values (what kind of schools we want) and interests (who supports which educational 
values) rather than apolitical logic” (p. 40).
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